The question of the minimum age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales is one which regularly arises. The recent confirmation of the abolition of the presumption of doli incapax raised some concerns about the resultant treatment of young people in the criminal justice system. This paper approaches this issue from 2 the perspective of England and Wales' compliance with human rights obligations.
Introduction
The minimum age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales is ten years of age. Below this age children cannot be convicted of any criminal offence. 1 It is often pointed out that this age is low in comparison with other European legal systems, 2 and that this young age is out of step with 'ages of responsibility' in other areas of the law (such as driving a car, purchasing cigarettes and alcohol, voting in elections, getting married, having sexual relationships, serving on a jury, entering contracts and choosing to refuse medical treatment), which are typically in the sixteen to eighteen age bracket. It is also suggested that the low minimum age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales is of dubious compatibility with obligations under various international human rights instruments. This paper explores the last of these arguments through an analysis of substantive criminal law and contemporary English criminal justice practice. The first part of the paper provides an exposition of the relevant international human rights provisions. Parts two and three examine the extent of compliance with these norms in the substantive criminal law and criminal justice process respectively.
The International Human Rights Framework
Various human rights norms potentially impact on the question of the criminal responsibility of children. This paper focuses, in particular, upon the Beijing Rules, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC) and the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).

Beijing Rules
International human rights instruments were relatively slow to give specific and careful attention to youth justice in general and to the question of the appropriate minimum age for criminal responsibility in particular. The first to do so in any detail was the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the so called Beijing Rules). These rules are not binding, states are merely invited to apply them, but because of their relative specificity on the age of criminal responsibility question, they are important. The original draft of the rules had stated that an age below 12 years would seem 'hardly compatible with the legal and social implications of criminal responsibility'. 3 However, agreement could not be reached on this part and it was excluded from Article 4(1) which provides: 'In those legal systems recognizing the concept of the age of criminal responsibility for juveniles, the beginning of that age shall not be fixed at too low an age level, bearing in mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual maturity.' An official 'Commentary' is attached to the Rules, and is viewed as a central part of them. This states that there should be 'a close relationship between the notion of responsibility of delinquent or criminal behaviour and other social rights and responsibilities (such as marital status, civil majority, etc.).'
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
In contrast to the Beijing Rules, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC), which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Interestingly, five dissenting judges held that a minimum age of criminal responsibility as low as 10, and consequent prosecution in criminal court at age 11, would almost certainly constitute a breach of Article 3. This is significant as the ECHR is a living document. In other areas of law, as the approach of member states to a particular issue has evolved, dissenting positions with significant support have, a number of years later, been adopted by the Court. 6 It is, however, difficult to discern precisely how generalisable the dissenting judges' finding, regarding the minimum age of responsibility, was intended to be. In particular, it is unclear whether they intended to say that 10 and 11 year olds must be immune from any youth justice intervention to be compatible with Article 3, or whether only a prosecution in a criminal court would constitute a breach.
There was also an attempt in the case to develop an argument combining the fair trial guarantees in Article 6 with the prohibition against discrimination (in this instance on grounds of age) in the enjoyment of Convention rights (Article 14). The argument was that a child just over the age of criminal responsibility, when prosecuted, is subject to arbitrary and unjustifiable discriminatory treatment in comparison to a child just under the minimum age, and that prosecution (particularly, as in the T v UK; V v UK case, where it is in the adult Crown Court) is disproportionate to any legitimate aim of the state. 7 The Court, however, did not examine this argument because the argument under Article 6(1) alone had been successful.
Having set out the relevant human rights instruments, the principal conclusion to be drawn is that while no absolute minimum age of criminal responsibility is set, an obligation is imposed on states to ensure that in responding to offending by young people, careful regard is paid to their special characteristics. Contemporary developmental psychological research, augmented by the findings from neuroscience, consistently points to the distinctive features of adolescents as a group. It suggests that they are typically less able to 'imagine alternative courses of action, think of potential consequences of these hypothetical actions, estimate probabilities of their occurrence, weigh desirability in accordance with one's preferences, and engage in comparative deliberations about alternatives and consequences.' 8 Importantly it also suggests that for most people this will be a temporary, 'adolescent limited', experience. 9 Such research has recently been utilised to help to persuade the U.S. Supreme Court that some of the most egregious examples of American penal populism (the application of the death penalty and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole to under 18s) were unconstitutional. 10 It serves to underline the necessity for a strong human rights framework in order to ensure both procedural and substantive protection for young people.
Prima facie, setting the minimum age of responsibility at 10 could raise questions as to England and Wales' compliance with these obligations. Indeed, on a number of occasions, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child in its monitoring reports on the UK's compliance with the UNCROC has explicitly expressed concern regarding the low age of criminal responsibility. 11 Goldson has argued that 'the practices of unequivocally "responsibilising" and "adultifying" children from the age of Historically, at common law, the doctrine of doli incapax provided a rebuttable presumption, with regard to children above the minimum age of responsibility but below the age of 14, that they lacked the capacity for criminal responsibility. Thus, in relation to a charge against such a young person, the prosecution had to establish not only that the young defendant was responsible for the actus reus of the offence, with the requisite mens rea, in the absence of a relevant substantive defence, but also was compelled to rebut the presumption of doli incapax by showing that the child appreciated that their actions went beyond 'mere naughtiness or childish mischief' and were 'seriously wrong'.
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A number of commentators have noted that, in practice, prosecutors were rarely troubled by doli incapax. 14 Nevertheless, it is clear that in the few cases where rebutting the presumption was problematic, it was irritating for the prosecutorial authorities. These irritations percolated to the surface of the judicial system in a number of appellate court decisions displaying considerable judicial disquiet. So, for example, Lord Justice Bingham was moved to observe that doli incapax could 'lead to results inconsistent with common sense'. 15 Such disquiet culminated in the attempt of Laws J to abolish the doctrine on the basis that it was, echoing Bingham LJ, 'unreal and contrary to common sense'. 16 Although the House of Lords subsequently allowed the Appeal in that case, because to do otherwise would involve inappropriate 'judicial legislation', 17 four members of the Committee strongly suggested that Parliament should consider revising the law. This invitation was embraced by the then Opposition Labour Party, which was in the process of shedding its perceived weakness in the 'politics of law and order', in comparison to the Conservative Party. 18 It therefore proposed in a Party Paper before the 1997
General Election, to abolish doli incapax and legislated to that effect in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. 19 Since the abolition of doli incapax, it could be suggested that the criminal law is blind to youth once the tenth birthday milestone is reached. This would not, however, pay sufficient regard to the scope for age to be recognised in other areas of doctrine. As noted above, in each criminal case the prosecution must prove that the defendant perpetrated the relevant harm with the requisite mens rea. Steyn, was even more direct in his recognition of the need for the criminal law to be conscious of the particular needs and rights of children. Importantly, he relied on Article 40 of the UNCROC (discussed above) to argue that it not only imposed procedural obligations on states to protect the special interests of children in the criminal justice system but was also relevant with regard to the substantive law. is not clear why this should not extend to the substantive law. As Halpin observes, ' The idea that these safeguards should be in place to ensure that the child is capable of participating in the proceedings, and then removed when it comes to determining the child's criminal responsibility, is inherently absurd.' 27 The age of the defendant may also come into play with regard to a number of the substantive defences. So, for example, 'duress by threats' provides a defence where a defendant has a reasonable belief he would be seriously injured or killed were he not to commit the offence, and that a person of 'reasonable firmness' would have done the same. 28 In assessing whether a person of 'reasonable firmness' would have so acted, the Court of Appeal specifically observed in Bowen that this objective evaluative standard could be adjusted to recognise youth, as 'a young person may not be so robust as a mature one.' 29 A similar allowance for relative youth, inherited from the common law defence of provocation, can also be found in the test for evaluating whether a defendant who lost their self-control exercised a 'normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint' in response to a fear of violence or an extremely grave circumstance, for the partial defence to murder of 'loss of control'.
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Finally, in this regard it is worth noting that in the context of sexual offences it is possible for defendants under the age of eighteen, in certain circumstances, to be prosecuted for a lesser offence with lower penalties than an adult would be in the same circumstances. 31 The substantive criminal law does therefore make some allowance for relative youth, but it is fair to say that there are considerable limitations. As regards recognition of relative immaturity through mens rea, this is clearly of limited use where aspects of an offence require objective or even strict forms of liability. Bennion has argued that in 'complex offences', the principle of mens rea demands that the prosecution demonstrate that young defendants are capable of understanding the ingredients of the crime. In other words, the concept of mens rea contains an implicit form of doli incapax within itself. 32 This argument has not, however, found favour with the appellate courts. Moreover, even in situations where a young person is accused of an offence with a subjective form of mens rea this, in reality, serves only a minimally protective function. There are two principal reasons for this. First, orthodox subjectivism in English criminal law demands only a fairly narrow cognitive capacity in relation to the intended or foreseen harm. Young children may well appreciate that their behaviour could hurt someone but have a relative lack of understanding of the full ramifications of that harm. Secondly, a distinction needs to be drawn between substantive provisions and evidential questions. Given that it is impossible for factfinders to know what was going on inside the defendant's head at the relevant time they are likely to resort to drawing inferences from their own (adult) experiences.
The limitations of current doctrine were also exposed in the recent case of R v
Wilson. 33 In that case a 13 year old boy helped his father to kill a man. He was too frightened of his father's violence to refuse. The Court of Appeal held that 'although there may be grounds for criticising' the position, the law was clear that duress was no defence to murder whether the defendant was the principal offender or, as in this case, an accessory. In his commentary on the decision Ashworth observed that it 'reflects badly on English criminal law. To apply the same standards to a 13-year-old as to an adult is to ignore large amounts of evidence about the immaturity of children.' 34 The inadequacy of the law of murder in recognising the distinctiveness of youth was understood by The Law Commission in its Report 'Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide'. 35 A cogent case was made for a partial defence to murder of 'developmental immaturity' based, in part, on the perversity of the present situation where an adult with a 'mental age' of ten could rely on a defence of diminished responsibility in response to a murder charge but an ordinary ten year old would not have such a partial defence. This proposal was rejected by the Government.
As well as the provision of specific examples illustrating the limitations of current criminal law doctrine in accommodating young people's needs, a wider point can be made about the general framework of criminal law. In England and Wales, the system is, in essence, underpinned by a liberal framework. The legitimacy of criminal punishment, according to orthodox liberal thought, is based on an assumption about individuals as autonomous moral agents with capacity for free will.
Where such an agent can be shown to have chosen to commit a criminal offence (without a valid justifying reason or excusatory condition) then legal punishment is justified. Norrie, in a series of publications, has built a powerful critique of this 'abstract individualism'. 36 His argument, in essence, is that the criminal law's myopic focus on individual responsibility and culpability, although providing a potentially important bulwark against drifts to authoritarianism, has the effect of marginalising and silencing other important explanations for the harm that has been caused by the crime. Empirical research suggests that youth offending is associated with a range of factors many of which cast serious doubt on the appropriateness of the criminal law's emphasis on individual agency, responsibility and punishment. Research, for example, has shown strong causal connections between certain behavioural disorders, such as attention deficit and hyperactivity, and youth offending and, moreover, that some people are genetically more likely to suffer from these conditions.' 37 Recently, as noted above, considerable attention has been paid to neuro-scientific research in which new brain imaging techniques have been used to suggest links between differences in neural functioning and offending. 38 Criminological research has also pointed to the importance of social context in explaining offending, including abusive family backgrounds, poverty, school exclusion and lack of job opportunities. 39 This research suggests that a complex web of responsibility surrounds each criminal act and that the reductionist tendency of criminal doctrine often serves to mask this. The appropriateness of criminal prosecution for children, which international human rights norms call into question, is also challenged by this body or research.
International human rights norms demand that the distinctiveness of youth be recognised whenever the criminal law is applied to children. The previous section has shown that substantive criminal law makes some allowance for youth. However, it is limited, particularly since the abolition of the doli incapax doctrine, but also because human rights are seen as relevant primarily to procedural protections rather than shaping questions of liability and responsibility. When one's focus shifts, however, from substantive doctrine, to criminal justice practice, there is an argument that the purchase of these international human rights instruments increases. What is clear is that whatever the technical legal position these norms should be central to prosecutorial decision making where children are involved.
Young People in the Criminal Justice System
Everyday and everywhere children and young people do things which cause harm.
This occurs in the home, in the school playground, in the park, outside the local shop, in the city centre and elsewhere. Often this can include hurting other people or interfering with others' property. Much of it could potentially come within the ambit of crime and criminal justice but, as Nils Christie writes, 'Crime does not exist. Only acts exist, acts often given different meanings within various social frameworks.
Acts, and the meaning given to them, are our data. Our challenge is to follow the destiny of acts through the universe of meanings.' 42 In other words, much of the harmful behaviour will never be thought of by anyone as 'crime', far less processed as such. So, for example, parents will deal with acts of aggression between their children, and wilful acts of damage to their property, without any recourse to the label crime. Similarly, schools will routinely deal with harmful behaviour in the classroom and the playground with varying degrees of formality but only very rarely through deployment of the crime label. Much the same thing could be said of all organised groups involved in the supervision of young people such as youth or sports clubs.
There is now a considerable body of empirical evidence examining the nature and extent of harmful behaviour which can be attributed to young people. Much of it is based on the use of 'self-report' survey techniques. The most recent of these, in 43 In common with previous studies of this nature it was found that 'offending' was by no means unusual among young people in England and Wales. In the latest sweep of the survey it was found that more than one quarter (26 per cent) of the 10 to 17 year olds sampled reported having committed one of the harmful acts covered. 44 This was higher for boys (30 per cent) than girls (22 per cent). A significant proportion of the youngest age bracket, 10-11 year olds, reported having offended (17 per cent) and the peak age of offending was in the 14-15 year old bracket (32 per cent); the prevalence of offending fell steadily in each subsequent age cohort. 45 The prevalence of offending reported by young people in the four successive sweeps of the survey did not change significantly over time. 46 In terms of the type of misbehaviour engaged in by young people, self-report studies tend to find relatively high proportions of minor or even trivial offences being reported (e.g. dodging fares, shop-lifting, criminal damage or graffiti) whereas reports of more serious offences (e.g. burglary or robbery) are much rarer. 47 Although the Home Office surveys consistently found 'assaults' to be highly prevalent, many of these were minor with little, or no, injury being caused. 48 With such a high prevalence of behaviour which could potentially be labelled and processed as 'criminal' being committed by young people, it is not surprising that, in terms of formal action: 'the typical response to youth crime is no response at all'. 49 Much of it goes undiscovered or, as noted above, is dealt with within other social institutions, such as the family or school. When behaviour which could be labelled as 'offending' is brought to the attention of the youth justice system, generally through the police, significant proportions of cases do not proceed to be dealt with formally.
For this reason changes in the numbers of offences and offenders recorded by the youth justice system over time do not (or do not only) reflect changes in youth crime rates but are, to a considerable extent, a function of changes in processing practice.
As one would expect, the system processes significantly fewer offences committed per cent of 10 year olds' disposals were pre-court. Recalling the relatively high prevalence of self-report offending uncovered in survey research, even amongst the youngest age brackets, it is clear that: (i) society filters out a very large proportion of young people's misbehaviour before it gets to the youth justice system; much which could be 'criminal' is not labelled as such; and (ii) the youth justice system deals with large proportions of the offences which are processed pre-court.
So from a large well of behaviour which could potentially be labelled and processed as criminal, the system selects only some, and it is at its most selective with the Subsequently, a practice direction was issued which required modifications to procedure to be made whenever children were prosecuted in the Crown Court. 55 (a longitudinal study following a cohort of children from the time they began secondary school in 1999), have found that, when self-reported offending was controlled for, 15 year-olds having 'adversarial contact with police' were much more likely to be low social class boys, from broken families and living in deprived neighbourhoods. They were also more likely to spend time 'hanging around' in public spaces. Crucially, following regression analysis, 'previous form' was found to be the most powerful predictor of later adversarial police contact.
In other words, first time contact with the youth justice system will tend to arise from a combination of offending (as well as other 'risky behaviours' such as under-age drinking and drug-use), coming from a certain disadvantaged background, and 'hanging around' in public places with similarly situated friends. Thereafter, it is the 'usual suspects' that become the recurring targets of the system. Moreover, further analysis has suggested that the deeper a young person is drawn into the youth justice system, and the more intensive the intervention, the less likely it is that they will desist from offending. 56 In other words, consistent with the classic labelling theorists of the 1960s, 57 and previous longitudinal research in England and elsewhere, 58 the study suggests that youth justice intervention can have perverse peak number of offences reached only a few years previously. 62 As noted above, the use of custody for under 18s has also been falling recently. Given that the best indications we have from self-report and victim surveys is that levels of youth crime have been quite stable over this period, these trends are most likely attributable to system effects. 63 While these recent downwards trends are welcome, a question of inter-generational justice arises as regards those children who were caught up in the system in the more zealous phase but who would not be so processed now. It also potentially arises in respect of future generations should policy and practice swing back in a more punitively interventionist direction in the years ahead. Significantly, questions of fairness, equality and justice also arise amongst current cohorts, as data suggests the extent and nature of youth justice intervention varies between different parts of the country, a 'post-code lottery' in common parlance, 64 and that there is some evidence of unjustifiable over-representation of certain ethnic minority groups in the system.
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Conclusion
This paper has examined the substantive criminal law of England and Wales and its application through the criminal justice system to children and young people, against a framework of relevant international human rights norms. On its face, the very low minimum age of criminal responsibility of 10 years looks problematic: the human rights perspective stresses the need for the special position of young people to be given careful consideration. Despite the abolition of the presumption of doli incapax some amelioration is provided by a degree of flexibility in a range of substantive criminal law rules but serious limitations remain. Of much greater significance is the world of criminal justice practice, where discretion is used to divert the vast majority of potentially criminal behaviour away from formal criminal justice processing.
Empirical research highlighting the potentially negative impact of intensive system contact underlines the importance of this and it is, accordingly, encouraging to see that there has been a reduction in the scope of criminal justice intervention in England and Wales over the last few years.
In the final analysis, however, empirical research also demonstrates the discriminatory way in which the criminal sanction is distributed to young people. The most equitable solution to this distributive injustice is, accordingly, to raise the minimum age of criminal responsibility, to at least 12 years of age (in line with recent moves in Scotland and Ireland) but preferably to 14. This action would help to secure
England and Wales' fulfilment of international human rights obligations.
